Widespread global collapses of fisheries corroborate decades-old predictions by economists, made long before large-scale industrialization of the world's fisheries, that open access would have deleterious ecological and economic effects on fishery resources. Incentive-based alternatives (collectively called catch shares) have been shown to generate pecuniary benefits, but little empirical evidence exists for, or against, a link to global fisheries sustainability. We report and expand on an analysis of >11,000 fisheries worldwide, in which we investigated the causes of fisheries collapse from 1950 to 2003. Using a program evaluation design, we found that catch shares prevent and, in some specifications, reverse fisheries collapse. Subsequent scientific studies reinforce and challenge these findings, suggesting fruitful avenues for future research linking incentive-based resource management to sustainability.
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental finding within environmental and resource economics is that incentivebased policies can reduce externalities in a least-cost manner. The social benefits from using incentives are pecuniary-society can achieve the same level of abatement as, say, a command-and-control approach but can do so at lower economic cost. This has given incentive-based approaches a prominent role within the discipline, and their use has spread across a range of environmental media.
Within fisheries, a stronger claim is often made: In addition to providing pecuniary benefits, regulating catch with incentive-based approaches (colloquially referred to as catch shares) leads to more sustainable resource use and thus to better conservation outcomes. Both theoretical evidence and empirical evidence provide strong support for the contention that catch shares improve the aggregate economic value of fisheries (e.g., Grafton et al. 2000 , Newell et al. 2005 ). This paper concerns recent empirical tests of the link between catch shares fisheries management and resource sustainability.
By ensuring exclusive access to a certain quantity of fish, fishermen can reduce costs by focusing on harvest efficiency rather than racing to harvest as much as possible from an allocation that is open to all fishermen. Catch share holders can also increase profit by matching the timing of catch with higher prices (e.g., by spreading catch over the year rather than flooding the market during an ever-shorter season). In these ways, catch shares overcome several of the externalities uncovered by Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955) to enhance profitability of fishing enterprises.
The alleged ecological benefits of catch shares are more contentious. Do property rights create better incentives for long-term stewardship, thus resulting in more sustainable fisheries? Some ecological benefits may arise from slowing the race to fish (Griffith 2008) . For example, there may be less discarding of fish and reduced mortality by discarded fishing gear. Other ecological benefits may arise if security of access to a share of the total catch creates incentives for fishermen to reduce overfishing to promote stock recovery (and thus future harvest) or to avoid sensitive spawning areas to increase stock productivity. Conversely, catch shares may promote ecologically harmful behavior such as high grading (discarding lesser-valued fish in the hope of later catching higher-valued fish). Empirical tests for these effects are quite rare. Here, we summarize recent empirical evidence and highlight some important avenues for future research linking fishery sustainability to incentive-based management.
Although catch share systems are globally rare (approximately 2% of global fisheries by stocks but up to 25% by volume), there now exist hundreds of different management "experiments" across many of the world's large marine ecosystems. Widespread use of catch shares began in the 1980s (although they have existed in some regions for centuries) and has spread across much of the globe, particularly in Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia and less frequently in North America. The application of various forms of individual quota management systems is growing rapidly worldwide, providing a rich source of insight into the question of whether exclusive access rights in fisheries can provide economic and ecological rewards.
Rigorously testing the effect of catch share implementation on metrics of sustainability (e.g., likelihood of fishery collapse or consistent stock biomass over time) is hampered by two inherent challenges. First, data on fish stocks and other measures of sustainability are sparse, are difficult to observe, and are almost never compiled in comprehensive databases amenable to empirical inquiry. As a result, empirical investigations typically either focus on only a single or a small set of fisheries or conduct more comprehensive analyses using proxies (such as fish catch), rather than ideal data (such as fish biomass). Second, as is common in program evaluation of environmental policy, treatments of catch shares are almost never randomly assigned across fisheries. This poses the familiar problem of biased estimates arising from endogeneity, in which an unobserved variable is correlated with both program treatment and the outcome of interest.
In 2008, we conducted and published a study assessing the global impact of a particular form of catch share (individual transferable quotas, or ITQs) on fisheries sustainability . That study used methods from the program evaluation literature in economics to provide the first global empirical analysis linking sustainability to incentivebased fisheries management. A key objective of the current paper is to expand on and interpret in greater detail the results of that study. A secondary objective is to report on the subsequent scientific literature on this subject to be used as a platform for future work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of fisheries management approaches, including catch shares, summarizing what is known from theory and empirical studies about the incentives each might provide for resource sustainability. Section 3 contains an expanded analysis of the global effects of one form of incentive-based fisheries management approach, ITQs, on fisheries collapse. In Section 4, we review and comment on several subsequent analyses contributing to the debate of whether ITQ management results in more sustainable fisheries. This provides a springboard for our conclusion: a discussion of what we know and do not know about the role of economic incentives in altering the sustainability of fisheries.
HOW FISHERIES ARE MANAGED
One cannot help but be struck by the dramatic heterogeneity of the >11,000 fisheries worldwide. A fishery is defined simultaneously by the people involved in the harvest, the species of fish, the harvesting area, the method of fishing, and the class of boats (FAO 2009). Because each fishery differs along some (or all) of these dimensions, each fishery's economic and ecological performance will likely differ under any given management institution.
Common Pool Fisheries Management
Most fisheries around the world are managed as common pool resources with either open or limited access to fish. Under open access, the fish stock (the good in question) is rival but nonexcludable, which suggests a market failure with deleterious economic effects. But even when fishing is limited, e.g., through fishing seasons, gear restrictions, or limited licenses, rents may be dissipated by excessive capital investment, redundant effort, inefficient timing of harvest, or other means. This collection of inefficiencies is referred to as the race to fish, a phrase that conjures the image of fishermen in an Olympics-style derby who race to catch as much as possible during a limited fishing season.
In the 1950s, this approach to management was predicted by economists to result in tragedy (Gordon 1954 , Scott 1955 , an outcome subsequently popularized by an ecologist (Hardin 1968) as the tragedy of the commons and refined in a contemporary context (e.g., Homans & Wilen 1997) . Although individually rational under the institution, this racing behavior ultimately leads to the economic, and often also the ecological, collapse of the fishery. When fishermen's behavior affects the overall level of harvest or productivity of the stock, overexploitation can result.
The widespread collapse of fisheries that predominantly employ these forms of regulation has been well documented (Worm et al. 2006 and references therein). On the one hand, it is thus surprising that the vast majority of the world's fisheries still utilize this approach. On the other hand, a substantial minority of fisheries have moved toward incentive-based approaches (i.e., catch shares) of various forms. In response, a burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature focuses on optimizing the design of catch shares to accommodate the economic, social, and ecological parameters and objectives of a given fishery. In this section, we briefly introduce these alternative property rights mechanisms, describe their operation and conservation incentives, and provide examples of places in which they have been implemented.
Individual (Transferable) Quotas
The most common form of catch share management in the developed world is the ITQ, which allocates to its owner the right to harvest a specified quantity of fish every year in perpetuity. That right is then divisible, leasable, and transferable across users. This approach mimics several cap-and-trade programs for air pollution. In fact, this is how rights were initially defined in New Zealand's pioneering ITQ implementation in 1986. A serious problem with this approach was discovered (also in New Zealand) when regulators wished to decrease the total allowable catch (TAC) for biological reasons (Rees 2005) . Doing so essentially constitutes a taking because it infringes on the (assumed guaranteed and perpetual) rights of the ITQ holder. Since that time, ITQs have been administered globally on a percentage basis, and the unit of the asset is a fraction of the TAC (see Newell et al. 2005) ; this fractional ownership is typically transferable. Ownership of fractional shares of the total catch in perpetuity provides an incentive to conduct the fishery in a manner that maximizes its net present value. Factors such as setting an appropriate allowable catch, avoiding sensitive areas or seasons, and targeting specific size classes of the resource may enhance the asset value of an ITQ.
In the absence of transferability, or with limited tenure, one's incentive for stewardship may approach zero as his tenure as a fisherman ends (Costello & Kaffine 2008) . However, if trade is unrestricted, quota shares could, at least in principle, flow toward users who prefer to conserve the stock rather than harvest it. Provided that the TAC is set in a formulaic manner that does not adjust upward to correct for conservation behavior, this scenario provides a conservation argument for transferability.
When fishing methods have a high probability of catching nontarget species of conservation concern, bycatch can be a serious problem regardless of the management regime. However, if ITQs are allocated only to target species, there may be little incentive to avoid bycatch of nontarget species (Squires et al. 1998 ). In such cases, multispecies ITQs have been implemented to create this incentive (Boyce 1996 , Squires et al. 1998 ). For example, the groundfish fisheries on the west coasts of Canada and the United States (pending) have implemented ITQ programs for >30 species simultaneously. Through structuring of the ITQs in this way, the market price for bycatch species reflects the difficulty of avoiding the catching of these species, rather than their marketability. Assuming that TACs are set appropriately, this provides incentives for avoiding bycatch that are commensurate with social objectives.
In fisheries subject to large interannual variability and uncertainty over stock sizes, it may not be practical or economically efficient to set a TAC (Weitzman 2002) . In this case, tradable effort units are often implemented. For example, Australia has implemented tradable net programs in its northern prawn fishery. Under the assumption that harvest is proportional to stock and effort, one can use fixed effort to extract a fixed share of the stock, even without information on the stock size. A key problem with this approach is effort creep, in which technological innovations on unregulated margins systematically increase the catch per unit of regulated effort over time (Wilen 1979 ).
Territorial User Right Fisheries
Whereas ITQs define property rights over shares of allowable catch, territorial user right fisheries (TURFs) define property rights over spatial areas of the ocean. Used extensively in countries such as Japan, Chile, and Mexico, TURFs may be particularly attractive in cases in which the harvested species are relatively sedentary as adults, such as abalone or sea urchins. In theory, TURFs create an incentive to steward the resources under one's exclusive control and can thus be effective at managing a suite of species simultaneously, particularly if they are ecologically related. Yet key challenges exist with this strategy. First, there is likely a spatial externality arising from adult or larval spillover from one TURF to the next (Janmaat 2005) . Although sufficiently large TURFs can in principle solve this problem (White & Costello 2010 ), a collective action problem arises when any single TURF is managed and harvested by multiple users (Cancino et al. 2007 , Heintzelman et al. 2009 ). However, successful examples of TURFs overlaid with cooperatives exist in Mexico, Japan, Chile, and elsewhere (Costello & Deacon 2007 ).
Fisheries Cooperatives
Even a well-designed ITQ or TURF system may not be capable of internalizing all externalities (Costello & Deacon 2007) . A principal concern is the ability of an incentive-based system to facilitate coordination among competing users of the common pool resource. Cooperatives offer an alternative or a complement to these more traditional approaches. To the extent that profitability is linked to conservation, cooperatives offer a promising model to overcome collective action problems (Deacon et al. 2008) . They are often enforced internally using strict regulations, social pressures, and penalty structures (Uchida 2007) , with the potential to organize fishermen in large, economically robust fisheries (e.g., the Pacific Whiting Cooperative) or in smaller, more artisanal fisheries (e.g., the Chignik Salmon Cooperative).
In some cases, the state grants a concession to exclusively harvest a fishery resource for a finite tenure to a cooperative of fishermen. For example, the spiny lobster fishery in Baja California, Mexico, is harvested by nine cooperatives along the Pacific coast. In that fishery, communities are allocated exclusive rights to harvest lobster (among other species) in specific spatial areas for a 20-year period. Subsequent renewal is contingent on performance. This mechanism provides at least two incentives for conservation. First, requiring stewardship as a necessary condition for renewal provides a strong incentive to comply. Second, insofar as conservation enhances stocks and thus profitability, there is an incentive for stewardship apart from renewal if the tenure length of the concession is sufficiently long (Costello & Kaffine 2008) .
Opt-In Sectors
A final approach to property rights allocation in fisheries involves delineating a portion of the fishery in which property rights will be designated and allowing fishermen to opt in, or out, of the sector. Although not used as extensively as the other approaches discussed above, this approach has recently been adopted in an Alaskan salmon fishery, in which the sector was a cooperative (Deacon et al. 2008) , and in the New England groundfish fishery, in which fishermen self-select into one of 19 geographically based sectors or into the status quo sector (Holland 2009 ). Deacon et al. (2010) examine the self-selection sector model of fisheries management and find several advantages. First, because fishermen self-select in, or out, of the sector, only those who stand to gain will opt in. This removes the substantial political hurdle of securing buy-in from all incumbent fishermen before moving to a property rights approach to fisheries management. Second, Deacon et al. argue that the allocation of rents among participants (those who opt in and those who opt out) can be engineered to be Pareto improving. In other words, the system can be designed so that the existence of the property rights sector does not impinge upon the profitability of those who opt out.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
We now turn to what is known about the connection between incentive-based approaches to fisheries management and sustainability, focusing on the most intensively studied form of catch shares, ITQs. In a widely cited contribution, Worm et al. (2006) document the alarming rate at which fisheries worldwide are collapsing. On the basis of a simple extrapolation of the observed collapse trend, they predict that all the world's fisheries may collapse by 2048. A natural interpretation is that the form of management most often observed globally (common pool fisheries management) is failing to prevent fisheries from collapsing. However, the focus of the study was on the relationship between biodiversity and ecosystem health, not on the role of fisheries management.
To test hypotheses about the importance of management and institutions for ecosystem health, we require data on the types of institutions being used to manage fisheries globally. To this end, we combined the same global database of catch statistics used in the Worm et al. (2006) (Figure 1 ; see color insert). We use the same metric of fisheries sustainability as Worm et al.: A fishery is defined as collapsed in year t if harvest in year t is less than 10% of the maximum recorded harvest up to year t. (Figure 2 ; see color insert). By contrast, there is a clear divergence in the collapse rates of these two groups during the 1980s, the period over which the majority of the ITQs in our sample were adopted, providing initial support for the hypothesis that catch share fisheries are less likely to collapse and, hence, are more sustainable.
The results in Figure 2 , although striking, are merely correlative. Proving rigorously that catch share management causes a reduction in fisheries collapse rates is far more challenging, if not impossible. However, we demonstrate here how we attempted to rule out alternative hypotheses as a means to further test for a causal relationship. Specifically, we need to address concerns that any observed benefits of catch share management may actually be due to (a) other events that occurred at the same time as the implementation of catch shares (for example, a large recruitment event) or (b) potential selection bias (for example, ITQs were adopted only for fisheries that were already performing better or were more likely to benefit from ITQ management). To do this, we draw on techniques commonly employed in the program evaluation literature.
Adopting the standard difference-in-differences approach to test the effect of the institutional treatment, we estimate the following model (and various derivatives; see Table 2 ) using a logit estimator:
Our outcome variable (collapsed i,t ) is zero for fishery i in year t if the fishery is not collapsed and is 1 if it is collapsed. We use a continuous variable for how many years an ITQ has been implemented in a fishery (years_of_ITQ i,t ). To account for differences between ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries (both before and after implementation of ITQs), we use a binary variable to indicate whether each fishery is in the ITQ group of fisheries (ITQ i ). The variable pre_trend i,t tests whether the trend toward 100% collapse is the same for ITQ and non-ITQ fisheries before the implementation of an ITQ. This variable is simply an interaction of the ITQ i variable and the year t variable (which denotes the year of observation) for all years prior to the implementation of an ITQ (zero otherwise). ITQ_implemented i,t is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for all years that a fishery is in an ITQ and zero otherwise. The overall picture that emerges from the results in Table 2 is fairly clear: ITQ fisheries are less likely to collapse than non-ITQ fisheries, and the magnitude of this effect increases the longer a fishery is managed by an ITQ. Specifically, our results suggest that ITQ fisheries are, in general, 6.9 to 7.1 percentage points less likely to collapse than non-ITQ fisheries. Each additional year the fishery is in an ITQ reduces the probability of collapse by 0.1 to 0.49 percentage points. The estimated effect is statistically significant at the 5% level or better in all four specifications. The general time trend toward 100% collapse for non-ITQ fisheries is estimated to be an increase of 0.54 to 0.55 percentage points per year. We find that the pretrend is statistically identical for both types of fisheries. The ITQ_implemented i,t variable tests whether or not there is an immediate time-invariant benefit to implementing an ITQ, and we find there is not. The temporal benefit of implementing an ITQ does not appear to change dramatically across the different model specifications that we examine ( Table 2) . The model specification in column 3 of Table 2 ,
which assumes that ITQ fisheries and non-ITQ fisheries have different collapse levels and that the benefits of implementing an ITQ accrue over time, is the preferred specification based on likelihood ratio test results. This specification also accords with intuition and bioeconomic theory; we would not expect ITQs to have an immediate effect on fisheries sustainability because there are inherent lags in the recovery of biological stocks.
In an attempt to account for potential selection bias, we estimate the above specification using the following three identification strategies: (a) restrict the sample to only those ecosystems or taxa that have experienced ITQ management, (b) use propensity score methods to match ITQ fisheries to appropriate control fisheries, and (c) use fixed-effects estimation to account for time-invariant biases. We find that our results are remarkably similar across all three approaches.
The first strategy involves restricting the sample to only those fisheries that are likely to share obvious similarities with ITQ fisheries. We restrict our sample to either only those LMEs that implemented ITQs by 2003 (LME sample), only those genera that experienced ITQs by 2003 (genus sample), or only those species that experienced ITQs by 2003 (species sample) ( Table 3) . The results from this analysis suggest that ITQ fisheries are 7.1 to 10.8 percentage points less likely to collapse than non-ITQ fisheries. Moreover, each year of being in an ITQ reduces the probability of collapse by an additional 0.42 to 0.52 percentage points. The estimated effects are statistically significant at the 1% level or better in all four specifications. For non ITQ fisheries, trend toward 100% collapse is estimated to be an increase of 0.51 to 0.59 percentage points per year (see the estimated coefficients on the year t variable). Finally, we conduct a series of Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient on years_of_ITQ i,t is equal in magnitude, but opposite in sign, to the estimated coefficient on year t . For all four samples, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that ITQs halt the trend toward total collapse. For the second strategy, we use a propensity score matching approach (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983), which attempts to control for selection bias by comparing outcomes using treatment and control groups that are as similar as possible. Propensity score methods attempt to summarize the pretreatment characteristics of each group into a single index, which is then used to match treated groups to their best controls. Alternatively, the score can be used as a regressor in a standard regression model. We adopt the latter approach because it allows for the inclusion of controls that we wish to exclude from the propensity score estimation. As outlined in Angrist (1998) , the differences between these two approaches are fairly superficial, especially when the estimated conditional probabilities are less than 0.5 (as is the case with most of our data).
To estimate the propensity scores, we determine the probability that a fishery will be managed with an ITQ system in a given year using four different specifications: (a) a model with a dummy variable for every LME; (b) a model with a dummy variable for every genus; (c) a model with a dummy variable for every species; and (d) a model with a dummy variable for every LME, genus, and species. Because the outcome variable is binary (managed using an ITQ or not), we use a logit estimator to estimate the following four models for each year in the sample:
PrðITQ
where LME i is a LME dummy variable, L is the total number of LMEs, genus i is a genus dummy variable, G is the total number of genera, species i is a species dummy variable, and S is the total number of species in the database. The estimated probabilities are essentially a year-by-year conditional probability of being selected into ITQ management. These conditional probabilities are then included as controls in our main regression model: 
:
The results of the propensity score regression models suggest that ITQ fisheries are 6.1 to 7.4 percentage points less likely to collapse than comparable non-ITQ fisheries ( opposite in sign to the general time trend (year t ) are not significant, providing further evidence that ITQs halt the trend toward 100% collapse. Our third identification strategy attempts to control for unobserved factors that may be biasing our results by introducing fishery-specific fixed effects ( Table 5) . These results suggest that each additional year of ITQ management reduces the log odds of the probability of collapse by 10.5 to 12.5 percentage points. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level or better in all three specifications. We report whether ITQ management reduces the log odds of the probability of collapse and not simply the probability of collapse because, to obtain marginal rates of change in a fixedeffects setting, we need estimates of any time-invariant unobservable influences that were removed from the likelihood function via the fixed-effects logit transformation. Obviously, it is not possible to include something that we cannot observe. The general trend toward 100% collapse is estimated to be an 8.0-to 8.9-percentage-point increase in the log odds of collapse per year. Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on years_of_ITQ i,t is equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the coefficient on year t reject the null at the 10% level or better. Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on years_of_ITQ i,t is less than or equal to the absolute value of the coefficient on year t reject the null at the 5% level or better. This provides some evidence that ITQ implementation may do more than halt the trend toward 100% collapse: It may actually reverse it. Combined, these results suggest that ITQ fisheries are more sustainable than other fisheries to begin with; they are between 6.1 and 10.8 percentage points less likely to collapse relative to non-ITQ fisheries. Furthermore, both sets of fisheries trend toward collapse at the same rate prior to ITQ implementation; switching to an ITQ not only slows the decline toward collapse but halts the trend. All model specifications and estimation techniques support these claims, with some suggesting even larger benefits. For example, as discussed above, fishery fixed-effects results suggest that ITQs not only halt the trend in global collapse but may actually reverse it. Therefore, the findings presented in and described in more detail here provide strong support for the hypothesis that exclusive access rights encourage stewardship and longterm sustainability of fisheries.
SUBSEQUENT SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS
As we discuss in the previous section, used the harvest database assembled by Worm et al. (2006) to assess fisheries collapse, adding an institutional database to examine whether fisheries managed by an ITQ system are less likely to Here we review subsequent papers linking incentive-based fisheries management to ecosystem outcomes. These include specific responses to , in addition to new research that cites and provides a more general response to the role of ITQ management in promoting sustainable fisheries. Heal & Schlenker (2008) summarized the ITQ program evaluation, referring to it as a "convincing and thorough analysis." They point out that the criterion for collapse used by and Worm et al. (2006) , which defines a fishery as collapsed when the catch declines 10% below the historical maximum to date, means that any policy that stabilizes catch will reduce the probability of collapse. To show that outliers in historical catch do not drive the result of Costello et al., Heal & Schlenker plot the catch history data for the 121 ITQ fisheries versus time since ITQ implementation. These economists show that for many of these fisheries, catch increases dramatically following ITQ implementation and that this result holds on average (using regression analysis), with mean catch almost tripling 10 years after implementation. This analysis, although technically sound, may oversell the benefits of ITQs. Catches are analyzed relative to the preimplementation average such that catch can decline only from 1 to 0 but can increase from 1 to infinity following implementation. This may overweight postimplementation increases, particularly when the mean response is examined. Large positive values can have a disproportionate influence on the mean relative to the fractional (1 to 0) responses resulting from decreasing catches. The mean is a somewhat misleading reflection of the full range of responses across fisheries, and using either median response or mean log response may provide a more accurate representation of the central tendency of the data. Subsequent analysis by Heal & Schlenker using log catches reveals a smaller but still significant increase following catch share implementation (W. Schlenker, personal communication). Altogether, there is evidence that ITQs can provide a win-win outcome, leading to fisheries that are less likely to collapse and that provide fishermen with higher harvests.
The journal Science published two response letters to the Costello et al. (2008) ITQ synthesis. The first pointed out that ITQs are a blunt fisheries management instrument and in some cases may establish perverse incentives (Smith et al. 2009 ). More specifically, the authors suggested that ITQs are not well suited to the management of international stocks, do a poor job of addressing bycatch and habitat destruction problems, and can create the incentive to high grade or overfish nonquota species. The second response followed in a similar vein, suggesting that ITQs will not work well for small-scale or data-poor fisheries and are associated with critical social disruptions such as fleet or buyer consolidation and barriers to new entrants (Ban et al. 2009 ). Although written in response to , these reactions are not criticisms of the actual analysis or findings of the paper but rather object to the implication that ITQs are a simple and universal solution to fisheries management problems. Indeed, ITQ design can take into account how different incentive structures can achieve different ecological, economic, and social outcomes (Lynham et al. 2009 ). Although there are ecological concerns (high grading, bycatch) that must be considered within an ITQ system, there is accumulating evidence that when designed well, an ITQ system can result in lower bycatch, enhanced fishermen support for lower TAC levels, and no increases in high grading (Grafton et al. 2006 , Branch 2009 , Lynham et al. 2009 ). Lastly, ITQs are not the only form of catch share management, as we highlight above in Section 2. The form of catch share used, the details of its design, and whether catch shares are complemented by other management tools such as marine protected areas must all be taken into account to improve fisheries sustainability.
Bromley (2009) published a more overarching critique of ITQs as a management strategy to align fishermen's incentives to be good resource stewards, claiming that such expectations are based on faulty logic within fisheries economics. Bromley likens rights-based fisheries management to the economic deregulation that led to the current financial crisis and suggests that expectations that ITQs will lead to more efficient, profitable, and sustainable fisheries are based on a confused understanding of economic concepts such as efficiency, rents, and property rights, among others. Two responses were published in the same volume of Fisheries, and we refer the reader to these papers for a more detailed assessment of Bromley's perspective , Harte et al. 2009 ). For example, Grafton et al. (2009) counter Bromley's claim that there is no evidence that missing property rights have caused economic overfishing (although this is not the only cause), reference several instances where they feel the paper has misrepresented the field of fisheries economics, and challenge the logic of Bromley advocating for a high-effort, low-stock state. Harte et al. (2009) argue that Bromley overgeneralizes arguments in favor of ITQs and is dismissive of empirical evidence of local successes. The authors point out that efficiency gains and improved resource sustainability may come with social and cultural costs and that therefore there is no universal fisheries management solution and most contexts will require a suite of management tools. Bromley's (2009) most specific response to the ITQ program evaluation raises an interesting question: Is the finding that ITQ fisheries are less likely to collapse a spurious result confounded by the addition of a TAC at the same time that fisheries were transitioned to an ITQ? Bromley (p. 284) writes, Since a "catch share" is a portion of an annual TAC, this would seem to suggest that prior to the introduction of catch shares there were no limits on total catch in these 121 fisheries. Could it be that all of these fisheries were crashing not because of the absence of IFQs (catch shares) but because of the absence of binding TAC limits? Is it possible that the authors have captured the effects of the introduction of catch limits (TACs) but have chosen to attribute the reversal of "eventual collapse" to catch shares (IFQs)?
TACs are an important management tactic to prevent overfishing, and therefore the sustainability benefits that we document may be attributable to the implementation of TACs, not to ITQs. However, Bromley's claim that there were no previous TAC limits for any of the 121 fisheries is incorrect. A quick review revealed that considerably more than 30 of these fisheries had TACs prior to ITQ implementation. Furthermore, a sizeable but as yet unquantified number of fisheries that have never been managed by ITQs also have annual TACs. A careful examination of Bromley's claim would require an empirical approach, like the one undertaken by , in which one would simultaneously test for the effects of TACs and ITQs. As a first step toward this goal, we present here the results from some simple analyses. We divide the sample of ITQ fisheries into two subsamples: those that had TAC limits before switching to ITQs and those that did not. We then repeat the fixed-effects analysis presented in Table 5 . On the basis of this initial (and admittedly imperfect) test of Bromley's hypothesis, we find some support for his claim and further evidence supporting the original findings in Costello et al.
The benefit of switching to an ITQ is stronger when no TAC was in place prior to the ITQ, but there is still a substantial benefit to switching to an ITQ in the presence of a TAC system ( Table 6) . The third and fourth columns of Table 6 confirm that there is a strong and statistically significant benefit to switching to an ITQ system, regardless of whether there was an existing TAC in place. Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the annual ITQ benefit (years_of_ITQ i,t ) is equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the annual time trend (yeart) are intriguing. For the sample of ITQ fisheries that had TACs before ITQs were introduced, we fail to reject the null. We also fail to reject the null that the annual ITQ benefit is less than or equal to the absolute value of the annual time trend. This suggests that when a TAC is already in place, ITQs halt but do not reverse the trend toward complete collapse. For the sample of ITQ fisheries that had no TACs before ITQs were introduced, we reject both the null that the annual ITQ benefit is equal in magnitude but opposite in sign to the annual time trend and the null that the annual ITQ benefit is less than or equal to the absolute value of the annual time trend. This is a much stronger result, suggesting that implementing a TAC and an ITQ at the same time can reverse the trend toward complete collapse. Thus, Bromley (2009) is correct that some of the benefits we have ascribed to ITQs can be attributed to the fact that some of these fisheries introduced TACs and ITQs at the same time. But the overall result of still holds: There is a clear benefit to implementing an ITQ, whether or not the fishery has a TAC. A common theme from recent research on ITQs is that this management approach cannot address all that ails the world's fisheries. Each setting and fishery for which ITQs are implemented will be met with unique challenges. For example, a recent case study of the British Columbia halibut fishery ITQ system documents numerous socioeconomic problems resulting from a large percentage of quota being leased, high lease prices, and the distribution of wealth to original quota recipients (Pinkerton & Edwards 2009 ). However, we argue that the issues raised by Pinkerton & Edwards can be addressed by properly designing the rules surrounding the ITQ prior to implementation or, in some cases, using other forms of property rights-based management or combining catch shares with other management tools. For example, wealth concentration, if viewed as a problem (e.g., too much wealth or power held by quota owners relative to quota lessees or crew; fisheries are a public trust that should not be freely gifted), can be solved by auctioning quota instead of allocating shares for free (Bromley & Macinko 2002) . Furthermore, consolidation is likely a necessary outcome of reducing the overcapacity that is common in open access fisheries regardless of the means used to reform fisheries management. With ITQs, however, individuals that leave the fishery are compensated for selling their quota rather than simply leaving because their business fails as the fishery declines in profitability. If there are clear social interests in limiting the scope of consolidation, however, ITQs provide diverse means of achieving such goals, such as setting caps on consolidation or ownership requirements. For example, the Alaska halibut fishery (one of the most acclaimed ITQ fisheries in history) has a consolidation cap of approximately 1%. Issues surrounding absentee owners, as discussed in the case of the British Columbia halibut fishery, can be addressed with owner-on-board provisions or other limitations on leasing (Pinkerton & Edwards 2009) . Although these adjustments may impose efficiency costs, ITQs may be implemented with other rules, regulations, or provisions to help customize management to meet the particular socioeconomic goals and needs of local communities. Problems often arise not as an inherent consequence of implementing ITQs but as a consequence of limited discussion of the overarching goals (economic, ecological, and social) prior to implementation.
In 2009 the journal Fish and Fisheries published a series of articles regarding the effects of ITQs on marine ecosystems. Of particular relevance here are Chu (2009) and Branch (2009) . Chu assembles before and after data on biomass of 20 species that switched to ITQs in the 1980s and 1990s. She finds that ITQs can decelerate the decline of stocks but that results are highly variable across fisheries. In 60% of cases, biomass increased following the ITQ, and in 40% of cases, it decreased. However, for this collection of species, it was not clear that biomass increases were an objective of the ITQ; for healthy stocks, one would not necessarily expect (or desire) an increase in biomass following ITQ implementation. Chu does not perform any statistical tests that attempted to control for selection into the ITQ program or for time, ecosystem, economic, or other variables. Furthermore, the database does not contain any counterfactual fisheries that did not switch to ITQs over that period. These limitations notwithstanding, Chu's paper provides an excellent case-by-case analysis of the likely drivers of biomass changes in these 20 fisheries. These case studies generate predictions and provide a platform for future statistical analyses that will link incentive-based management approaches to ecosystem outcomes.
In the same volume, Branch (2009) surveys 227 peer-reviewed studies on ITQs, with an emphasis on their ecosystem effects. He reviews the relevant published results for a suite of ecosystem performance measures and, with some notable exceptions, generally finds strong evidence of a positive ITQ effect on sustainability of target species. Like the Chu (2009) paper, the greatest strengths of Branch (2009) are case-by-case anecdotes. For example, he details several case studies of stewardship actions by quota holders in ITQ fisheries (e.g., lobbying for a decrease in the total catch or industry payments for enforcement or stock enhancement activities). He finds other examples of positive ecosystem effects of ITQs, including better compliance with the TAC, reduced mortality of fish from abandoned fishing gear, reduced discarding (when well monitored), reduced fleet size, some evidence of reduced habitat damage, and contributions by fishermen to data collection efforts.
Examples in which ITQs appear to have had negative ecosystem effects almost unanimously occur in fisheries without adequate monitoring and enforcement. Negative effects include some high grading (although Branch 2009 argues it is uncommon), some discarding, and an incentive for excessive harvest by individual fishermen. An obvious point, related to the Bromley (2009) paper, is that if the allowable catch is excessive, ITQs cannot achieve positive ecosystem effects. Branch (2009) finds strong evidence that the adoption of an ITQ leads fishermen to request smaller allowable catches, likely because sustainability of the resource is tied to the asset value of the ITQ. Whereas Branch (2009) and Chu (2009) provide informative case studies, Essington (2010) assembles a new database of several North American fisheries to statistically test two central hypotheses on the incentives for sustainability provided by catch shares. By assembling data directly on fish stock sizes, Essington overcomes the limitations of using catch as a proxy for stock size. He is careful to use program evaluation methods to test his hypotheses, recognizing that treatments are not randomly assigned across fisheries. Essington (2010) first examines the effect of catch share implementation on various conservation indicators (biomass, discards, fishing effort, etc.). He is unable to detect a statistically significant change in these indicators following implementation (except for discard rate, which declines in catch share fisheries). This result is perhaps unsurprising for two reasons. First, his small sample of fisheries makes statistical detection of an effect difficult. Second, it is not clear that the measured indicators (reducing discards, for example) were desired objectives of the catch share program. Next, he evaluates the effect of catch shares on the temporal stability of fishery indicators (landings, biomass, etc.) . He finds strong evidence of enhanced stability following catch shares, which accords with Heal & Schlenker's (2008) interpretation of the results in . Although we are unaware of a theoretical literature linking fisheries stability and incentive-based management, Essington provides some heuristic arguments for why this result agrees with basic economic intuition.
The scientific findings reviewed here highlight how the nature of the debate is quickly transitioning from the question of whether catch shares work to more nuanced questions of how to design a catch share system to best address the diverse goals, challenges, and needs of individual contexts. Furthermore, it is indisputable that catch shares are gaining more prominence in public and policy arenas around the world. For example, a LexisNexis search tracking the number of news hits for the terms catch shares or ITQs over time shows a dramatic increase over the past three years in media coverage of catch share fisheries management. Therefore, as this important fisheries management tool faces more widespread adoption, it is essential that fisheries scientists and economists address many of the challenges and issues that are raised in this section and, in particular, explore alternative property rights mechanisms (see Section 2) that may provide creative (and possibly more effective) solutions.
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
Incentive-based approaches to environmental management are now default tools in the policy designer's toolbox; they can attain a given level of environmental quality at minimum cost to the economy. In fisheries, a suite of incentive-based approaches (collectively called catch shares) have had strong pecuniary effects, but their effects on conservation outcomes and resource sustainability are less well studied. We expound upon the first global empirical assessment linking catch shares to fisheries sustainability ) and discuss the subsequent literature addressing this subject. That literature provides initial support that catch shares can (a) decrease fishery collapse, (b) enhance sustainability, and (c) increase dynamic stability of several ecological and economic performance measures. But these studies are not without limitations.
To draw further generalizations on the ability of catch shares to incentivize resource sustainability and conservation, there is a clear need for further rigorous empirical assessment of fisheries institutions and their outcomes. Because institutions are rarely implemented in a controlled experimental setting, empirical assessments must avoid using statistical tools that inherently assume that an institutional treatment (such as an ITQ) has been randomly assigned. The program evaluation literature provides a suite of methodologies for combating the nonexperimental nature of most data on fisheries management. and Essington (2010) employ these approaches; similar analyses of other forms of incentive-based fisheries management would greatly enhance our understanding of the connection between catch shares and resource sustainability.
Many important questions remain unanswered. tested whether catch shares impact fisheries catch on a global scale. Essington (2010) evaluated the impact of catch shares on a more ecologically important outcome metric, biomass, but restricted the geographic scale of the study to North America. There is a clear need to replicate the Essington study on a global scale and to extend the Costello et al. analysis framework to other types of catch share management. Worm et al. (2009) have collated the data to answer the first question, so it is poised to be answered. Costello et al. and Essington both find that catch shares lead to more stable catches. Future work could focus on uncovering the underlying mechanisms driving this stability.
Another important research agenda would address the link between fisheries institutions and marine conservation goals and management tools. For example, does the presence of catch shares affect the political desirability or the efficiency of implementing marine protected areas? Are catch shares compatible with the global movement toward 316 Costello et al.
ecosystem-based management and marine spatial planning? How do the design elements of a catch share system (e.g., divisibility, ownership, allocation, tenure length) relate to ecosystem outcomes such as catch, biomass, bycatch, high grading, habitat damage, employment, consolidation, and economic performance? The answers to these and related questions will help shape marine resource management, conservation, and economic outcomes over the coming decades.
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